Read the Federal Judge’s Ruling (2024)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWAUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,Plaintiff,VS.Case No. 4:24-cv-00162-SHL-SBJSTATE OF IOWA; KIMBERLY REYNOLDS,in her official capacity as Governor of the Stateof Iowa; BRENNA BIRD, in her officialcapacity as Attorney General of the State ofIowa; IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICSAFETY; and STEPHAN K. BAYENS, in hisofficial capacity as Commissioner of IowaDepartment of Public Safety,Defendants.ORDER GRANTING MOTIONFOR PRELIMINARYINJUNCTIONIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWAIOWA MIGRANT MOVEMENT FORJUSTICE; JANE DOE; and ELIZABETH ROE,VS.Plaintiffs,Case No. 4:24-cv-00161-SHL-SBJBRENNA BIRD, in her official capacity asAttorney General of the State of Iowa;KIMBERLY GRAHAM, in her official capacityas Polk County Attorney; and ZACHHERRMANN, in his official capacity as ClaytonCounty Attorney,Defendants.ORDER GRANTING MOTIONFOR PRELIMINARYINJUNCTION1

I. INTRODUCTION.Dissatisfied with how the United States Government is handling immigration, the IowaLegislature decided to take matters into its own hands by enacting new legislation (known asSenate File 2340) that, among other things: (i) imposes criminal penalties under state law forcertain immigration-related offenses; and (ii) requires state court judges to order noncitizens toreturn to the foreign countries from which they came. As a matter of politics, the new legislationmight be defensible. As a matter of constitutional law, it is not. Under binding Supreme Courtprecedent, Senate File 2340 is preempted in its entirety by federal law and thus is invalid underthe Supremacy Clause. The Court therefore GRANTS the motions for preliminary injunction filedby Plaintiffs in these related cases and ENJOINS the enforcement of Senate File 2340 pendingfurther proceedings.II.BACKGROUND.A. Senate File 2340.On April 10, 2024, Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds signed into law Senate File 2340, whichadds Chapter 718C to the Iowa Code. The law goes into effect on July 1, 2024, and creates twonew criminal offenses under Iowa law. The first, codified at Iowa Code § 718C.2(1), states:1. A person who is an alien commits an offense if the person enters,attempts to enter, or is at any time found in this state under any of thefollowing circ*mstances:a.b.The person has been denied admission to or has beenexcluded, deported, or removed from the United States.The person has departed from the United States while anorder of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding.Iowa Code § 718C.1(1) defines “alien” to “mean[] the same as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101, as ofJanuary 1, 2023." As of January 1, 2023, “alien” was defined as “any person not a citizen ornational of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).¹ A violation of § 718C.2(1) is generally anaggravated misdemeanor, although it can be a class “C” or “D” felony if the person has qualifyingprior convictions or satisfies other conditions. See id. § 718C.2(2).The second new criminal offense is codified at § 718C.5(1), which states:1. A person who is an alien commits an offense if all of the following aretrue:1The definition of “alien" remains the same today.2

a.The person has been charged with or convicted of an offenseunder this chapter.b.C.A judge has issued an order under this chapter for the personto return to the foreign nation from which the person enteredor attempted to enter.The person failed to comply with the order.A violation of § 718C.5(1) is a class "C" felony. Id. § 718C.5(2).Following a person's initial appearance on the charge of violating §§ 718C.2(1) or718C.5(1), a state court judge is permitted to issue a written order “discharg[ing] the person andrequir[ing] the person to return to the foreign nation from which the person entered or attemptedto enter...." Id. § 718C.4(3). Such an order is permitted only with the person's consent, and onlyif the person has not been previously convicted of an offense under Chapter 718C. Id. If a personcharged with an offense under Chapter 718C does not consent to an order requiring them to returnto the foreign nation, the State may continue with the prosecution under §§ 718C.2(1) or718C.5(1). Id. Section 718C.6 states: “A court may not abate the prosecution of an offense underthis chapter on the basis that a federal determination regarding the immigration status of the personis pending or will be initiated.""Upon a person's conviction of an offense under [Chapter 718C], the judge shall enter inthe judgment in the case an order requiring the person to return to the foreign nation from whichthe person entered or attempted to enter. An order issued under this subsection takes effect oncompletion of the term of confinement or imprisonment imposed by the judgment." Id. §718C.4(4). Such an order must identify the "manner of transportation of the person to a port ofentry" and the “law enforcement officer or state agency responsible for monitoring compliancewith the order.” Id. § 718C.4(5). Iowa Code § 718C.1(2) defines “port of entry" to "mean[] a portof entry in the United States as designated by 19 C.F.R. pt. 101." According to the Code of FederalRegulations, there are two ports of entry in Iowa: the Des Moines International Airport and QuadCities International Airport. See 19 C.F.R. § 101.3.2B. The Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice Plaintiffs.Plaintiff Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice (“Iowa MMJ") is a statewide membership-based legal service and advocacy organization headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa. (Iowa MMJ2 The Quad Cities International Airport is actually in Moline, Illinois, and thus it appears that the Code of FederalRegulations is inaccurate. This is not material to the outcome here.3

Docket³ ECF 9-5, ¶ 3.) Its legal staff provides immigration representation and consultations tononcitizens, advising over 2,400 clients in 2023. (Id., ¶¶ 6, 9.) Iowa MMJ's advocates seek toimprove immigrants' lives in four ways, through issue campaigns, narrative change, coalitionbuilding, and civic engagement. (Id., ¶¶ 10–15.) Erica Johnson, Iowa MMJ's founding executivedirector, asserts that Senate File 2340 will frustrate Iowa MMJ's ability to keep providing services.(Id., 2, 25, 36.) She explains that Senate File 2340 will require Iowa MMJ to expand their intakeprocess to analyze potential state criminal prosecution for immigration offenses, which will divertlegal staff's attention away from other priorities and toward things like helping clients fill outFreedom of Information Act requests to compile a full immigration profile, which wasn'tpreviously required. (Id., ¶¶ 27, 29.) As a result, Iowa MMJ won't be able to serve as many clientsand its grant funding, which requires Iowa MMJ to meet specific deliverables, may be jeopardized.(Id., 25.) Iowa MMJ's legal staff also will need to analyze Senate File 2340's effect on pastclients and defend clients against prosecution in state court, which, again, will pull resources awayfrom current projects. (Id., ¶¶ 30–31.) Iowa MMJ's new focus on these areas will impede its abilityto represent lawful permanent residents in their naturalization applications, help those with DACArenew their status, and represent Afghan evacuees, all of which are currently among Iowa MMJ's"core" services. (Id., ¶¶25, 35.)According to Johnson, Iowa MMJ's advocacy work has already changed to accommodateSenate File 2340. (Id., ¶ 36.) Before the bill passed, staff devoted significant resources to opposingit. (Id., ¶ 37.) After it was enacted, staff started educating the community about its consequences.(Id., 38.) When staff are fielding calls from members about the bill and preparing fact sheets andarranging speakers to discuss Senate File 2340, they can't engage in grassroots efforts or traditionaloutreach activities, both of which are "core" advocacy functions. (Id., ¶¶ 39-41.) Johnson expectsSenate File 2340 to continue to frustrate Iowa MMJ's advocacy goals even after the public iseducated; for example, the law will break down community bonds and damage other relationshipsIowa MMJ has worked for years to cultivate. (Id., ¶ 43.)Plaintiffs Jane Doe and Elizabeth Roe are members of Iowa MMJ. (Id., ¶¶ 23–24.) Doe isa lawful permanent resident of the United States and citizen of Mexico. (Iowa MMJ Docket ECF9-3, 2.) She is a 68-year-old widow with five children and seventeen grandchildren. (Id.) She hasnever been convicted of a crime. (Id., ¶ 3.) In 2000, Doe and her children came to the United States3 All references to the “Iowa MMJ Docket” are to the electronic case filings in Case No. 4:24-cv-00161.4

to reunite with her husband, who was a United States citizen. (Id., ¶¶ 5, 9.) In 2005, she returnedto Mexico after her mother passed away. (Id., ¶ 10.) When Doe tried to reenter the United States afew months later, she was stopped by immigration officials, detained for about half a day, and sentback to Mexico. (Id.) She was issued a removal order. (Id.)Because Doe's husband had U.S. citizenship, he was able to file a petition for her to returnto the United States. (Id., ¶ 12.) However, he died before it was approved. (Id.) After his death, thepetition was converted to a widow petition and eventually approved, with her prior removal orderbeing waived. (Id., ¶¶ 13–15.) As a result of the approval, Doe obtained a green card and becamea lawful permanent resident. (Id., ¶¶ 14–15.) She settled in Garnavillo, Iowa, because two of herdaughters live in Iowa for work. (Id., ¶ 16.) She is using the pseudonym “Jane Doe” because sheis scared of being prosecuted under the law and removed to Mexico. (Id., ¶ 17.) She also wants toavoid the stress and anxiety of having her name made public. (Id., ¶ 20.)Roe is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and citizen of Columbia. (IowaMMJ Docket ECF 9-4, ¶ 2.) She is forty years old and married to a United States citizen. (Id.) Shehas never been convicted of a crime. (Id., ¶ 3.) She came to the United States for the first time inSeptember 2016 to reunite with her brothers, both of whom are United States citizens. (Id., ¶ 6.)Immigration officials detained her at the border for twenty-four hours and gave her an expeditedremoval order. (Id., ¶ 7.) However, they released her from custody and allowed her to go to Iowa,subject to the requirement that she report to the immigration office every month. (Id.) In February2017, Roe was deported for missing a reporting date. (Id., ¶¶ 8-9.) She married her husband inColumbia in April 2018, and he applied for her to obtain a green card and return to the UnitedStates to live with him. (Id., ¶ 10.) Her prior removal order was waived as part of the green cardapplication process, and the application was eventually approved. (Id., ¶¶ 11, 13.) She returned tothe United States as a lawful permanent resident in May 2023. (Id., ¶ 13.) She now lives in DesMoines, Iowa. (Id., ¶ 4.) She is using the pseudonym “Elizabeth Roe” because she is afraid of theconsequences of her true name becoming public. (Id., ¶ 16.)C. Potential Impacts of Senate File 2340 on Federal Immigration Laws and InternationalRelations.The United States submitted three Declarations regarding the impact of Senate File 2340.The first is from Eric Jacobstein, who is employed by the United States Department of State as5

Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. (United States Docket+ECF 7-2, ¶ 1.) According to Jacobstein, Senate File 2340 threatens to harm United States foreignrelations in four ways: (1) it antagonizes foreign governments; (2) it threatens to undermine thefederal government's comprehensive policy framework for addressing regional irregularmigration; (3) it is inconsistent with the United States' treaty obligations; and (4) it risks reciprocaland retaliatory treatment of United States citizens abroad. (Id., ¶ 8.)As it relates to animosity with foreign governments, Jacobstein says the Mexicangovernment has already expressed concerns about SF 2340 in public statements and duringmeetings with State Department and White House officials. (Id., ¶ 11.) The Mexican governmentexpressed similar concerns with a recent bill enacted in Texas, known as “S.B. 4,” which hasconsiderable overlap with Senate File 2340. (Id., ¶ 12.) Like S.B. 4, Jacobstein says one of thechallenges with Senate File 2340 is that it permits Iowa state judges to order removal of a personto the country from which the person entered, without knowing whether the person is a citizen ofthat country or if that country will accept them. (Id., ¶ 13.) This will “frustrate the United States'relations with other countries regarding noncitizen removals and likely other important bilateralissues." (Id.) According to Jacobstein, Senate File 2340 also affects the efficacy of federal actionsto secure the border and stem irregular migration. (Id., ¶ 15.) He says that “[d]iplomatic discussionsconcerning migration are delicate and cannot be successful if the government does not speak withone voice." (Id., ¶ 16.)As it relates to comprehensive foreign policy strategy, Jacobstein says the United States"must establish long-term strategic partnerships with the governments in the [North and CentralAmerican] region to catalyze structural change to root out corruption and impunity, improvesecurity and the rule of law, and increase economic opportunity." (Id., ¶ 18.) The United Stateshas used an executive order, Executive Order 14010, to “outline[] a comprehensive foreign-policyframework to collaboratively manage migration." (Id., ¶ 19.) This has resulted in cooperativestrategies with foreign governments like Mexico. (Id., ¶¶ 19–21.) These strategies are designed,among other things, to strengthen asylum systems and regularization programs in countries otherthan the United States. (Id., ¶ 22.) Jacobstein says Senate File 2340 undermines these effortsbecause it is inconsistent with the United States' treaty obligations and therefore damages thecountry's credibility. (Id., ¶¶ 23-24.)4 All references to “United States Docket" are to the electronic case filing system in Case No. 4:24-cv-00162.6

Speaking of treaty obligations, Jacobstein says Senate File 2340 is inconsistent with theConvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment(the "Convention Against Torture"), which prohibits the return of noncitizens to countries wherethey face torture. (Id., ¶ 25.) Similarly, under the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to theStatus of Refugees (the "Refugee Protocol”), noncitizens may be entitled to withholding ofremoval if they will face persecution in the country to which they would be returned on the basisof race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. (Id.)Jacobstein points out that Senate File 2340 contains no exception for an individual who fearspersecution or torture and therefore could result in “refoulement,” which occurs when a noncitizenis constructively or actually forced to return to a place where the noncitizen will face persecutionor torture. (Id., ¶¶26-27.) Not only would this potentially violate the United States' treatyobligations, it also would compromise the United States' credibility in negotiations with foreigngovernments on the same and similar issues. (Id., ¶¶ 28–29.)Finally, Jacobstein says Senate File 2340 will create a risk of reciprocal and retaliatorytreatment of United States citizens at home and abroad. (Id., ¶ 30.) For example, he points out thatRussia passed a law in 2012 banning the adoption of Russian children by United States citizens inretaliation for the United States passing a law designed to punish Russian officials for the death ofa Russian prisoner. (Id.) Jacobstein reiterates that "it is critically important that nationalimmigration policy be governed by a uniform legal regime, and that decisions regarding thedevelopment and enforcement of immigration policy be made by the federal government, so thatthe United States can speak to the world with one voice." (Id., ¶ 32.)The United States' second Declaration is from Ted Kim, the Associate Director of theRefugee, Asylum and International Operations (“RAIO”) Directorate within the U.S. Citizenshipand Immigration Services (“USCIS"), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). (UnitedStates Docket ECF 7-3, ¶ 1.) Kim's Declaration focuses on the asylum application process in theUnited States, which is a detailed and comprehensive process designed to ensure that noncitizensare not returned to countries where they may be tortured or persecuted. (Id., ¶¶ 4-8.) Federalasylum laws and regulations are designed, among other things, to satisfy the United States'obligations under the nonrefoulement provisions of the Convention Against Torture and RefugeeProtocol. (Id., ¶¶ 4–5.) Asylum applications can be filed proactively by noncitizens to USCIS ordefensively in removal proceedings before the Department of Justice's Executive Office for7

Immigration Review (“EOIR”). (Id., ¶ 6.) Either way, specially trained federal officials and judgesevaluate whether the noncitizen has a credible fear of persecution or torture. (Id., ¶¶ 14–15.)According to Kim, Senate File 2340 “does not appear to have any of the safeguards in place forasylum applicants, or for noncitizens seeking withholding of removal or protection under theConvention Against Torture that are available under U.S. law.” (Id., ¶ 16.) Accordingly, in hisview, Senate File 2340 will impact potential and actual asylum applicants, as well as noncitizensapplying for statutory withholding from removal and protection under the Convention AgainstTorture. (Id., ¶ 17.) “Furthermore, noncitizens detained under SF 2340, or removed from theUnited States, would be unable to participate fully in federal immigration proceedings,” thuspotentially impacting the outcome of those proceedings. (Id., ¶ 18.)The United States' third and final Declaration is from Russell Hott, the Deputy ExecutiveAssociate Director of DHS, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), andEnforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”). (United States Docket ECF 7-4, ¶ 1.) ICE isresponsible for enforcing more than 400 federal statutes, and its mission includes removingnoncitizens who lack lawful immigration status or are otherwise removable under federal law. (Id.,¶ 6.) For non-detained individuals alone, ICE manages a docket of more than 7.2 million cases.(Id., 7.) There are over 6,000 immigration officers employed by ERO, plus another 6,100 SpecialAgents employed by ICE's law enforcement component, Homeland Security Investigations. (Id.,¶ 8.) Effective November 29, 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued Department-wideguidance prioritizing DHS's limited law enforcement resources on the apprehension and removalof noncitizens who threaten national security, public safety, and border security. (Id., ¶¶ 9–10.)Hott's Declaration summarizes the removal process under the Immigration and Nationality Act,which involve due process protections, multiple avenues for relief, and several layers of review byimmigration judges and Article III judges. (Id., ¶¶ 11-17.) Hott says that Senate File 2340 "doesnot appear to ensure comparable procedures,” but rather requires state court judges to proceed withprosecutions under Iowa Code Chapter 718C even if federal proceedings are pending or may beinitiated. (Id., ¶ 18.)According to Hott, as of April 14, 2024, ICE has almost 5,000 cases involving a final orderof removal for a person with a last claimed address in Iowa. (Id., ¶ 19.) In addition, ERO has morethan 23,000 cases involving non-detained noncitizens who provided a last claimed address in Iowa.(Id.) If Iowa imposes criminal penalties for unlawful reentry by noncitizens, it might lead those8

citizens to depart Iowa for other states, thus straining ICE's resources to try to find them. (Id., ¶20.) Moreover, Hott says Iowa has not identified a mechanism for effectuating and verifying thereturn of noncitizens to the country from which they entered, thus creating the risk of potentialconfusion and strained relationships. (Id., ¶ 21.) The immigration laws passed by Iowa and otherstates, if allowed to go into effect, will create “a piecemeal system of immigration" and force thefederal government to “navigate an impossible patchwork of regulations affecting the enforcementof federal law." (Id., 22.)D. Procedural Posture.On May 9, 2024, the Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Declaratory andInjunctive Relief against Iowa Attorney General Brenna Bird, Polk County Attorney KimberlyGraham, and Clayton County Attorney Zach Herrmann. (Iowa MMJ Docket ECF 1.) Later thesame day, the United States filed its Complaint against the State of Iowa, Iowa Governor KimReynolds, Iowa Attorney General Bird, the Iowa Department of Public Safety, and IowaDepartment of Public Safety Commissioner Stephan Bayens. (United States Docket ECF 1.) Boththe Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs and United States seek a declaratory judgment and preliminary andpermanent injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of Senate File 2340. On May 10, 2024, theIowa MMJ Plaintiffs formally moved for a preliminary injunction, supported by declarations.(Iowa MMJ Docket ECF 9.) The United States followed suit three days later, also supported bydeclarations. (United States Docket ECF 7.) In the Iowa MMJ Case, Defendants Graham andHerrmann have agreed to comply with any injunction the Court might enter but otherwise haveagreed with the Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs to a stay. (Iowa MMJ Docket ECF 26, ECF 33.) All otherDefendants resist the motions for preliminary injunction. (Iowa MMJ Docket ECF 36; UnitedStates Docket ECF 19.) These Defendants did not submit declarations or present other factualevidence; rather, they resist the motions for preliminary injunction entirely on legal grounds. (Forsimplicity, this Order will use the term “Defendants” or the “State" to refer to all Defendants otherthan Graham and Herrmann.)The Court has not formally consolidated the two cases. In the interest of efficiency,however, the Court did hold a single hearing on the two motions for preliminary injunction. TheCourt is likewise issuing this single ruling to address both motions, although the unique featuresof each case will be discussed where relevant below.9

III.PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD."A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Tumeyv. Mycroft AI, Inc., 27 F.4th 657, 664 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). “[T]he burden of establishing the propriety of an injunction is on themovant." Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 2021). The Courtmust consider four factors: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of thebalance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other partieslitigant; (3) the probability that [the] movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.”Sleep No. Corp. v. Young, 33 F.4th 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quotingDataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). "While nosingle factor is determinative, the probability of success factor is the most significant.” Carson v.Simon, 978 F.3d 1051, 1059 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). For actions that seek to enjoin theenforcement of a duly enacted state statute, the moving parties must show that they are likely toprevail on their claims. D.M. by Bao Xiong v. Minn. State High Sch. League, 917 F.3d 994, 1000(8th Cir. 2019). This is a higher standard than applies in other preliminary injunction cases. See id."We apply a heightened standard in such instances because the duly enacted state statuteconstitutes government action based on presumptively reasoned democratic processes, and suchaction is entitled to a higher degree of deference and should not be enjoined lightly." Id. (internalpunctuation and citation omitted).With respect to the remaining three factors, a plaintiff “is not required to prove withcertainty the threat of irreparable harm, but it must prove that 'irreparable injury is likely in theabsence of an injunction.”” Sleep No. Corp., 33 F.4th at 1018 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22).“Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuriescannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown's,LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). “In balancing the equities, [the Court] weigh[s] ‘the threatof irreparable harm' shown by the movant against ‘the injury that granting the injunction willinflict on other parties litigant.”” MPAY Inc. v. Erie Custom Comput. Applications, Inc., 970 F.3d1010, 1020 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dataphase Sys., 640 F.2d at 113.) This “requires a court todistinguish between weak or illusory injuries and very real threats of injuries.” Rodriguez v.Molina, 608 F. Supp. 3d 791, 798 (S.D. Iowa 2022) (cleaned up). It considers harm to both thelitigants and other interested parties, like the public. Wachovia Sec., L.L.C. v. Stanton, 571 F. Supp.10

2d 1014, 1047 (N.D. Iowa 2008). The last factor, the public interest, “invites the court to indulgein broad observations about conduct that is generally recognizable as costly or injurious.” Id. at1048.IV.LEGAL ANALYSIS: STANDING.A. Legal Background.As a preliminary matter, the Court must decide whether: (a) the United States has standingto challenge Section 45 of Senate File 2340, which requires state court judges to enter ordersrequiring certain noncitizens to return to the foreign countries from which they came; and (b) theIowa MMJ Plaintiffs have standing to challenge any aspect of Senate File 2340. To establishstanding, “a plaintiff must present a ‘case' or 'controversy' within the meaning of Article III ofthe Constitution." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009). "This'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing' requires a showing of ‘injury in fact' to theplaintiff that is ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,' and 'likely [to] beredressed by a favorable decision.”” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992)). "Whether a plaintiff has shown such an injury ‘often turns on the nature and source of theclaim asserted."" Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). “[T]he question whetherhe has a cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing is closely bound up with the question ofwhether and how the law will grant him relief.” Id.B. The United States Has Standing to Challenge Senate File 2340 in Its Entirety.Defendants argue that the United States lacks standing to challenge Section 4 because itimposes requirements on state court judges, none of whom are defendants. (United States DocketECF 19, p. 18.)7 To support their argument, Defendants rely on the Eighth Circuit's decision inDigital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, which involved a constitutional challenge to anArkansas statute making it unlawful to use automatic license plate reader systems. 803 F.3d 952,955 (8th Cir. 2015). The Arkansas statute was not enforceable by state or local prosecutors, butrather through private actions for damages. Id. at 958. The Eighth Circuit therefore held that theplaintiff did not have standing to sue the Arkansas Governor or Attorney General. Id. at 957–58.5 Codified at Iowa Code § 718C.4.6 Defendants concede that the United States has standing to challenge the portions of Senate File 2340 other thanSection 4.7 All citations are to the page numbers in the upper righthand corner of each page, which are auto-populated by theelectronic case filing system. These page numbers are often different than those placed by the parties at the bottom ofeach page.11

Defendants are overreading Digital Recognition Network. Unlike a damages award in aprivate lawsuit under the Arkansas law, the judicial order contemplated by Section 4 only comesinto effect if the Attorney General or a County Attorney pursues charges against someone underthe criminal provisions of Senate File 2340. The United States' injury is therefore “fairly traceable"to these officials. See id. at 957 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997)). In otherwords, there is a causal connection between the injury to the United States and the conduct of theAttorney General or County Attorney; the injury is not the "result of 'the independent action ofsome third party not before the court."" Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also HawkeyeCommodity Promotions, Inc. v. Miller, 432 F. Supp. 2d 822, 835 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (concludingthat statutory grant of discretion as to when to enforce a law gives attorney general "someconnection with the enforcement” of state law), aff'd sub nom. Hawkeye Commodity Promotions,Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 2007). There is nothing in Digital Recognition Network tosuggest standing is absent in these circ*mstances; to the contrary, the Eighth Circuit has affirmedstanding in analogous situations. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir.2011) ("When a statute is challenged as unconstitutional, the proper defendants are the officialswhose role it is to administer and enforce the statute.").C. The Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge Senate File 2340 in Its Entirety.Defendants also dispute the standing of the Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs, whom Defendants arguecannot challenge any aspect of Senate File 2340. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Doe and Roelack standing because they are lawful permanent residents to whom, in Defendants' view, SenateFile 2340 does not apply. (Iowa MMJ Docket ECF 36, p. 17.) Similarly, Defendants argue thatIowa MMJ lacks direct or organizational standing because its Complaint merely identifies: (a)three Iowa MMJ members who are authorized to be in the United States, none of whom, accordingto Defendants, are at risk of injury if Senate File 2340 goes into effect; and (b) one member,identified as "David," for whom there is insufficient detail to plausibly establish the requirementsfor standing. (Id., p. 19.) Defendants also argue that Iowa MMJ lacks organizational standingbecause the diversion of resources the entity claims it will experience from the enactment of SenateFile 2340 is self-inflicted and does not constitute an injury-in-fact. (Id., pp. 19–21.)As to Plaintiffs Doe and Roe, Defendants' arguments revolve largely around the properinterpretation of Iowa Code § 718C.2(1), which makes it a criminal offense if “[a] person who isan alien . . . enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in this state under any of the following12

circ*mstances: a. The person has been denied admission to or has been excluded, deported, orremoved from the United States[3] b. The person has departed from the United States while anorder of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding.” Defendants argue that criminal liabilitydepends on the person's current immigration status and that the statute does not apply to someonewho was previously deported or removed but is now lawfully in the United States.Defendants' argument is difficult to square with the statutory language. Each of PlaintiffsDoe and Roe is an “alien[] . . . in this state. . . [who] has been denied admission to or has beenexcluded, deported, or removed from the United States." Id. In Doe's case, this occurred when shetried to reenter the United States after returning to Mexico following her mother's death in 2005;in Roe's case, it occurred when she was deported for failing to report to the immigration office inFebruary 2017. There is no exception in § 718C.2(1) for an alien whose removal order has beenwaived or who otherwise has been granted permission to be in the country after previously havingbeen “denied admission” or “excluded, deported, or removed.” To the contrary, the statute’srepeated and insistent use of the past tense-i.e., “denied,” “excluded,” “deported,” and"removed" indicates that a person will be criminally liable based on what happened in the past,not based on current legal status. Or, at least, this interpretation of the statute is plausible enoughto give Doe and Roe standing, as it gives them a credible fear of prosecution. See Ark. Right toLife State Pol. Action Comm. v. Butler, 146 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir 1998) (“Plaintiffs, however, arenot required to expose themselves to arrest or prosecution under a criminal statute in order tochallenge a statute in federal court."); see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442U.S. 289, 302 (1979) (holding that standing existed even though criminal penalty provision hadnot yet been applied, as fear of prosecution was not “imaginary or wholly speculative” whereprovision "on its face" proscribed the proposed conduct and state "ha[d] not disavowed" anyintention of invoking it).Defendants urge the Court to avoid this problem by applying the principle that courtsshould “interpret a statute to avoid doubt as to its constitutionality.” Crowell v. State Pub. Def.,845 N.W.2d 676, 689 (Iowa 2014). To that end, Defendants argue that Iowa Code § 718C.2(1)was modeled after the federal illegal reentry statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), and therefore should beinterpreted the same way. There is, however, a glaring problem with this argument. True, thefederal and Iowa statutes start in the same place by making it a crime for an alien to be presentafter having been “denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or ha[ving] departed the13

United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding.” The federalstatute goes on, however, to state that a person has not committed the offense of illegal reentry if:(A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or hisapplication for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the AttorneyGeneral has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission;or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed,unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain suchadvance consent under this chapter or any prior Act.8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). In other words, a person with lawful permanent resident status has a defenseunder federal law to the charge of illegal reentry. See United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642F.3d 717, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). But there is no comparable language in Iowa Code § 718C.2(1).This difference between the Iowa and federal illegal reentry statutes is crucially importantin two respects. First, as a matter of pure statutory interpretation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) and IowaCode § 718C.2(1) both use the past tense to describe the circ*mstances that constitute illegalreentry; i.e., a person is guilty if the person is present or tries to reenter the country but "has beendenied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an orderof exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding.” If, as Defendants argue, this language refersonly to current immigration status despite the repeated use of the past tense, there would have beenno reason for Congress to insert defenses into 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) for noncitizens with permanentlegal status. The fact that Congress inserted those defenses therefore shows that it deliberately usedthe past tense in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). It would be odd to conclude that the Iowa Legislature usedthe very same words in the very same (past) tense in Iowa Code § 718C.2(1) and yet was referringto current or prevailing legal status, present tense. Yet this is Defendants' argument: they want theCourt to interpret the same words in the two statutes in two different ways. This is not a persuasiveargument.Second, and relatedly, given that the Iowa statute is modeled in every other way on thefederal statute, the Court must give effect to the Iowa Legislature's conspicuous decision not toinclude the defenses that exist under federal law. See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Johnson Cnty., 730N.W.2d 677, 679 (Iowa 2007) (“Statutory text may express legislative intent by omission as wellas inclusion."). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that when state and federal statutesaddress the same topic, differences between the two matter. See, e.g., EMC Ins. Grp. v. Shepard,960 N.W.2d 661, 672 (Iowa 2021) (refusing to apply federal law definition of key term in statestatute; “such a change in the legislative definition must come from the legislature"); MidAmerica14

Sav. Bank v. Miehe, 438 N.W.2d 837, 838 (Iowa 1989) (refusing to adopt federal standards wherethe Iowa Legislature "adopted federal law for some, but certainly not all, purposes" relating to theobject of the legislation). The Iowa Supreme Court has similarly recognized that when "Congressincludes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the sameAct, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparateinclusion or exclusion." Oyens Fees & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Iowa2011) (quoting Chestnut v. Montgomery, 307 F.3d 698, 701-02 (8th Cir. 2002)). Here, theseprinciples of statutory construction dovetail and require the Court to conclude the Iowa Legislaturewas not trying to “mirror” federal illegal reentry law in every respect when it enacted Senate File2340, but rather wanted to take Iowa's law in a different direction than federal law by removingdefenses. See Jama v. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) ("We do not lightlyassume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends toapply.").The canon of constitutional avoidance allows the Court to “interpret the statute, not rewriteit.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018); accord In re Det. Of Wygle, 910 N.W.2d599, 617 (Iowa 2018) ("If fairly possible, we will construe a statute to avoid doubt as toconstitutionality." (emphasis added)). Here, Defendants want the Court to rewrite Senate File 2340by interpreting the past tense to mean the present tense and add defenses the Iowa Legislatureintentionally chose not to include. This the Court cannot do. See Jennings; 583 U.S. at 286; UnitedStates v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480–81 (2010).There are other problems with Defendants' interpretation, too, including that theirinterpretation of § 718C.2(1) conflicts with their interpretation of § 718C.6, which prohibits a statecourt from abating the prosecution of an illegal reentry offense against someone even if a federaldetermination regarding the person's immigration status is pending or will be initiated. Defendantsargue that because § 718C.6 only forbids abatement as to pending and yet-to-be-initiated federaldeterminations, the Iowa Legislature must have intended to require abatement when a federaldetermination is already final. (United States Docket ECF 28, pp. 43-44.) In other words,Defendants urge the Court to apply the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to concludethat the Iowa Legislature created a “default rule” of abatement of prosecutions in § 718C.6whenever the United States has given someone permanent legal status. But Defendants also arguethat the Iowa Legislature did not intend for people with permanent legal status to be prosecuted15

under § 718C.2(1) in the first place. It is difficult to understand why § 718C.6 would need to beinterpretated to mandate prosecutorial abatement when there has been a final federal determinationof someone's lawful status if § 718C.2(1) doesn't permit the arrest or prosecution of such a personat all. In these circ*mstances, Defendants are effectively admitting the problem they have with theplain language of § 718C.2(1), which applies to people previously “denied admission” or"excluded, deported, or removed" without regard to current status. This captures Doe and Roe.Because Plaintiffs Doe and Roe satisfy the statutory language as written, they will"commit[] an offense” if they are “at any time found in this state. . . ." It follows that they have acredible fear of prosecution, and thus standing to challenge Senate File 2340. The AttorneyGeneral's promise not to prosecute people within Senate File 2340's plain language doesn't changethis. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 480 ("We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merelybecause the Government promised to use it responsibly.”). Indeed, although the Attorney Generalhas the discretionary authority to get involved in local prosecutions, she cannot control thecharging decisions made in the first instance by the ninety-nine County Attorneys in Iowa. SeeIowa Code § 13.2(1)(b) (granting discretionary authority to the Attorney General to “[p]rosecuteand defend . . . all actions and proceedings. in which the state may be a party or interested,when, in the attorney general's judgment, the interest of the state requires such action, or whenrequested to do so by the governor, executive council, or general assembly”). It follows that Doeand Roe have a credible fear of prosecution irrespective of how the Attorney General purports tointerpret the law. See St. Paul Area Chamber of Com. v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481, 486 (8th Cir.2006) (concluding that plaintiffs had credible fear of prosecution despite previous failure toenforce statute where county attorneys had “taken an oath” to enforce state law); United Food &Com. Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 429 (8th Cir. 1988) (holdingthat standing existed even though state officials had no "present plan" to enforce statute becausestate's position "could well change”). Moreover, even as to the Attorney General, Senate File 2340is so new that there is no longstanding “state policy” of non-enforcement that the Court could relyupon to conclude that Doe and Roe lack a credible fear of prosecution. See Gaertner, 439 F.3d at486.Once the standing of Doe and Roe is established, the standing of Plaintiff Iowa MMJ isestablished as well. “An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when [1]its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, [2] the interests at stake are16

germane to the organization's purpose, and [3] neither the claim asserted nor the relief requestedrequires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). The association “need not establishthat all of its members would have standing to sue individually so long as it can show that ‘anyone of them' would have standing." Iowa League of Cities v. E.P.A., 711 F.3d 844, 869 (8th Cir.2013) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 511), enforced sub nom. Iowa League of Cities v. Env't Prot.Agency, No. 11-3412, 2021 WL 6102534 (8th Cir. Dec. 22, 2021).The first and third requirements for organizational standing are satisfied because Doe andRoe have standing, and Iowa MMJ seeks “only declaratory and prospective injunctive relief,"which makes participation by individual members unnecessary. See Heartland Acad. Cmty.Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 2005). The second requirement—whether the"interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose”—is also satisfied because Doe's andRoe's right to remain in Iowa as lawful residents goes to the heart of Iowa MMJ's work. See, e.g.,Miss. Coal. for Env't v. FERC, 544 F.3d 955, 957 (8th Cir. 2008) (where organization's missionwas preserving the environment, organization had standing to challenge action that increased riskof environmental harm). (See also Iowa MMJ Docket ECF 9-5, ¶ 4.) Therefore, Iowa MMJ hasstanding based on its members Doe and Roe.Although David is not separately named as a plaintiff, he nonetheless gives Iowa MMJ analternative basis for standing because the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to plausibly establishthat David would have standing in his own right. The Complaint alleges that David is an IowaMMJ member who was deported but returned to the United States shortly after removal to care forhis mother and sister. (Iowa MMJ Docket ECF 1, ¶ 14.) The Complaint further states that hegraduated from high school in Iowa in 2007 and is at risk of being arrested for violating SenateFile 2340. (Id., ¶ 60.) In context, these allegations are fairly read to mean David is in Iowa giventhat he: (a) graduated from high school here; (b) is an Iowa MMJ Member; (c) asserts a fear ofarrest for violating Senate File 2340, which could only occur if he is in Iowa (or intends to try toenter); and (d) never claims to reside anywhere else. David therefore has a credible fear ofprosecution under Senate File 2340. See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302. Moreover, unlike Doe and Roe,both of whom are legally present in the United States under federal law, David does not allegelawful permanent resident status, and thus he is at risk of prosecution even under Defendants’proffered interpretation of Senate File 2340's illegal reentry provisions. See id.17

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Doe and Roe have individual standingand Plaintiff Iowa MMJ has organizational standing. It is unnecessary for the Court to decidewhether Iowa MMJ has standing based on the impact of Senate File 2340 on its own resources.V.LEGAL ANALYSIS: DATAPHASE FACTORS.A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits.1. The United States Has a Viable Cause of Action in Equity.Turning to the merits, Defendants argue, first, that the United States has failed to state aviable claim because the Supremacy Clause does not create a cause of action where none otherwisewould exist. (United States Docket ECF 19, p. 17.) This argument emanates from Armstrong v.Exceptional Child Center, Inc., in which health care providers sued state officials in Idaho forallegedly violating federal law by setting reimbursem*nt rates too low for services covered byMedicaid. 575 U.S. 320, 323–24 (2015). The Supreme Court held that the providers had no causeof action under the Supremacy Clause, nor could they proceed in equity. Id. at 327, 329.Defendants' reliance on Armstrong is unpersuasive. Three years before Armstrong, theSupreme Court decided Arizona v. United States, holding that federal immigration laws preemptedan Arizona law imposing criminal penalties for immigration-related offenses and authorizing stateofficials to investigate and make arrests for immigration violations. 567 U.S. 387 (2012). TheUnited States initiated Arizona by suing Arizona officials in equity for violating the SupremacyClause. Id. at 393. Defendants' argument here, if accepted, would mean the Supreme Courtunnecessarily reached the merits in Arizona and should have concluded the United States did nothave a cause of action in the first place. In other words, Defendants' position is that the SupremeCourt missed a threshold and outcome-determinative issue.Defendants are misinterpreting Armstrong. Although it held that the Supremacy Clausedoes not independently create a cause of action, Armstrong also reaffirmed the well-establishedprinciple that equity will provide such a cause of action in appropriate circ*mstances. Id. at 327–28. Those circ*mstances did not exist in Armstrong because the relevant statute reflectedCongress's intent to foreclose equitable relief. Id. There is nothing in Armstrong to suggest,however, that the United States cannot bring a cause of action in equity to try to establish federalpreemption of state law. Id. To the contrary, both before and after Armstrong, courts haveconsistently entertained lawsuits brought by the United States in equity to enjoin a state law basedon the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 596 U.S. 832 (2022); United18

States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d518, 523-24 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012); seealso United States v. Texas, 557 F. Supp. 3d 810, 820 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (“[T]he United States hasbrought many lawsuits under the Supremacy Clause in the years since Armstrong without anyquestioning of the Supremacy Clause as the basis for a federal cause of action.") As Defendantshave not cited a single case to the contrary, the Court has little difficulty rejecting their positionthat the United States has not stated a viable cause of action.2. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Prevail in Arguing that Federal Immigration LawsPreempt Senate File 2340.-------The next question is whether the United States and Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs are likely tosucceed on their preemption arguments. The Western District of Texas (Ezra, J.) recently analyzedthis issue in the context of a Texas law, S.B. 4, that contains similar language to Senate File 2340.See United States v. Texas, F. Supp. 3d 2024 WL 861526 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2024). TheUnited States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not yet issued a final decision on appealfrom Judge Ezra's ruling, but it did issue an extensive interlocutory ruling denying Texas's requestfor a stay of enforcement of the injunction. See United States v. Texas, 97 F.4th 268 (5th Cir.2024). Both the Fifth Circuit and Judge Ezra concluded that S.B. 4 is likely unconstitutional onpreemption grounds under Arizona, 567 U.S. 387. This Court finds their analysis persuasive andequally applicable to Senate File 2340.In Arizona, the Arizona Legislature enacted a law that created two new immigration-relatedcriminal offenses, one for failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements and theother for seeking or engaging in work in Arizona as an unauthorized alien. 567 U.S. at 393–94.The law also contained provisions giving state and local law enforcement officers the authority tomake warrantless arrests of people believed to be removable from the United States and to makea “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status" of any person stopped, detained, orarrested, if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in theUnited States.” Id. at 407, 411. The Supreme Court held that the two new criminal provisions werepreempted by federal law and therefore properly enjoined. Id. at 403, 407. It further held that theprovision authorizing state and local law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests ofpeople suspected of being removable was also preempted by federal law and properly enjoined.Id. at 410. It reversed the entry of injunctive relief, however, as to the provision requiring state andlocal law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of anyone they arrest if there19

is reasonable suspicion that the person is in the country unlawfully, holding that “[t]here is a basicuncertainty about what the law means and how it will be enforced. At this stage, without the benefitof a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume [the law]will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.” Id. at 415.Unlike Senate File 2340 (and S.B. 4 in Texas), the Arizona law at issue in Arizona did notimpose state criminal penalties for the crime of illegal reentry. The Arizona law did, however,"replicate[]" federal alien-registration laws by "add[ing] a state-law penalty for conduct proscribedby federal law.” Id. at 400, 403. The Supreme Court held that Arizona was preempted from doingso because Congress fully occupied the field of alien registration, leaving no room for additionalstate regulation. Id. at 401. It did not matter that the Arizona law “ha[d] the same aim as federallaw and adopt[ed] its substantive standards” because “States may not enter, in any respect, an areathe Federal Government has reserved for itself." Id. at 402.The Fifth Circuit and Judge Ezra concluded that the Supreme Court's logic applies withequal force to state law attempts to criminalize illegal reentry. See Texas, 97 F.4th at 279–82;Texas, 2024 WL 861526, at *11–18. The Fifth Circuit explained that “Congress enacted theImmigration and Nationality Act (INA) to establish a ‘comprehensive federal statutory scheme forregulation of immigration and naturalization' and to set ‘the terms and conditions of admission tothe country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.”” Id. at 279–80 (quotingDeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353, 359 (1976)). S.B. 4 interfered with this comprehensive federalscheme by criminalizing behavior “already prohibited by the INA.” Id. at 280. According to theFifth Circuit, this is just as problematic in the context of illegal reentry as it is in the context of thealien-registration statute at issue in Arizona; in both places, “[p]ermitting the State to impose itsown penalties for the federal offenses here would conflict with the careful framework Congressadopted." Id. (quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 402).In arguing otherwise, Defendants try to distinguish Arizona by pointing out that theArizona law criminalized alien-registration violations that were not criminal offenses under federallaw. The Arizona law therefore went further than federal law. Like the Fifth Circuit and JudgeEzra, however, the Court concludes that there is no reasonable way to interpret Arizona asforbidding state law attempts to criminalize alien registration violations but allowing state lawattempts to criminalize illegal reentry. The underlying problem is the same in either context:Congress “left no room” for state regulation because such regulation would “frustrate federal20

policies" and interfere with the comprehensive scheme established under federal law. See Arizona,567 U.S. at 399, 402; see Texas, 97 F.4th at 279–86. It follows that Senate File 2340 is fieldpreempted. See Texas, 97 F.4th at 286 (holding that the federal government has occupied the“entire field of unlawful entry and reentry of noncitizens as well as removal” (internal punctationomitted)).Arizona would compel this conclusion irrespective of whether there are substantivedifferences between the criminal provisions of Senate File 2340 and the federal illegal reentrystatute because field preemption makes any such differences irrelevant. Nonetheless, it is worthnoting that Senate File 2340 also would be preempted under principles of conflict preemption,which "exists where 'compliance with both state and federal law is impossible,' or where 'the statelaw stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectivesof Congress."" Pharm. Rsch. & Mfgrs. of Am. v. McClain, 95 F.4th 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2024)(quoting Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015)). Here, under federal law, peoplelike Plaintiffs Doe and Roe are not criminally liable for illegal reentry because, although they werepreviously removed from the United States, they later obtained permanent legal status and thusnow have a meritorious defense to an illegal reentry charge. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). By contrast,under Iowa Code § 718C.2(1), permanent legal status is not a defense, and thus Doe and Roe havecriminal exposure. Meaning: the State of Iowa can arrest them and put them in jail for somethingthe United States has given them permission to do. This is untenable. See Texas, 2024 WL 861526,at *21 (holding that S.B. 4 “plainly conflicts with federal law by instructing state judges todisregard pending federal defenses"); see also South Carolina, 720 F.3d at 530 (“In essence, [statelaw] operate[s] to criminalize unlawful presence, a stance plainly at odds with federal law.”).Equally untenable is the fact that Senate File 2340 prohibits state court judges from abatingprosecutions for illegal reentry while the person being prosecuted seeks relief under federal law.See Iowa Code § 718C.6 ("A court may not abate the prosecution of an offense under this chapteron the basis that a federal determination regarding the immigration status of the person is pendingor will be initiated."). The point is clear: Senate File 2340 does not permit federal immigration lawto run its course. Under principles of conflict preemption, this violates the Supremacy Clause. SeeTexas, 97 F.4th at 291 (giving state judges power to make removal decisions without notice to orconsent from the federal government “conflict[s] with federal law” and “sidesteps the sensitiveissues that federal immigration officers are to consider”)21

The fact that Senate File 2340 compels Iowa state court judges to issue orders requiringnoncitizens to return to the foreign nation from which they came makes the conflict preemptionproblem even worse. See Iowa Code § 718C.4(4). Congress has established an intricate andspecialized system, with multiple layers of review by trained immigration officials and judges, fordetermining when someone can be removed from this country and where they must go. See Texas,97 F.4th at 284–85. Importantly, noncitizens are not always returned to the foreign nation fromwhich they came; instead, there are sometimes national security, border security, or foreign affairsreasons for sending them elsewhere. See Jama, 543 U.S. at 348. By contrast, Senate File 2340recognizes none of this nuance and instead bluntly requires state court judges to order aliens toleave the United States and return to the foreign nation from which they came. Again, this createsan untenable dichotomy between federal and state law in an area where the Supreme Court hasrecognized that the United States must speak with a single, harmonious voice. See Texas, 97 F.4that 291 (recognizing it “significantly conflict[s]" with federal law when state court judges arepermitted to select the countries to which noncitizens will be removed).Although it would not matter to the outcome, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants'argument that Iowa Code § 718C.4(4) merely requires Iowa state court judges to perform a"ministerial" function. There is nothing “ministerial" about issuing an order “requiring the personto return to the foreign nation from which the person entered or attempted to enter,” particularlywhen noncompliance with the order is punishable by imprisonment. See Texas, 2024 WL 861526,at *15–16 (rejecting Texas's position that removal order was not a true “removal” and concludinginstead that such orders are an “especially problematic intrusion on federal prerogatives"). Indeed,Senate File 2340 even requires the state court judge to identify the “manner of transportation ofthe person to a port of entry” and the “law enforcement officer or state agency responsible formonitoring compliance with the order.” Iowa Code § 718C.4(5). This is for all intents and purposesan order of removal, except that it: (i) is issued by judges who have no training or experience withthe nuances of the removal process (not that Iowa Code § 718C.4(4) allows any nuance anyway);(ii) does not contain the safeguards that are present under federal law; and (iii) makes no attemptto account for the complexities associated with deciding whether to remove someone and to where.The bottom line is that Senate File 2340 is preempted by federal law under principles ofboth field and conflict preemption. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 409 (“[T]he removal process is2222

entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.”). The United States and Iowa MMJPlaintiffs are therefore likely to prevail on their claims under the Supremacy Clause.83. The Remaining Dataphase Factors Weigh in Favor of Injunctive Relief.Because the likelihood of success factor is the most important to determining whether toaward injunctive relief, see Carson, 978 F.3d at 1059, the Court's analysis of the merits goes along way toward making such relief appropriate. Nonetheless, the Court also will analyze the otherthree Dataphase factors: threat of irreparable harm, balance of harms, and public interest. See SleepNo. Corp., 33 F.4th at 1016 (listing factors).As to irreparable harm, some courts have held that “Supremacy Clause violations trigger apresumption of irreparable harm,” see United States v. Idaho, 623 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1115 (D.Idaho 2022), or that the “United States has shown irreparable harm as a matter of law" in suchcirc*mstances, Texas, 2024 WL 861526, at *38. The parties have not cited- -nor has the Courtindependently located- –an Eighth Circuit case using such strong language, and thus the Court willnot treat irreparable harm as automatic or even presumed when the United States shows alikelihood of success on preemption. Nonetheless, persuasive authority recognizes that the UnitedStates clearly would suffer some level of significant harm when a state tries to enforce its ownimmigration laws that are likely preempted by federal law. See, e.g., South Carolina, 720 F.3d at533; Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301 (“The United States suffers injury when its valid laws in a domainof federal authority are undermined by impermissible state regulations."). This makes sense: thewhole point of field preemption, in particular, is that the federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasivethat Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399 (quotingRice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).In the context of Senate File 2340, the potential harms include, inter alia: (a) permanentlegal residents facing a risk of prosecution and criminal punishment under state law despite havingpermission under federal law to be present in the United States; (b) state court prosecutions forillegal reentry moving forward even when defendants are in the process of applying for legal statusunder federal law; (c) untrained state court judges entering orders requiring noncitizens to leavethe United States following an adjudicatory process with fewer safeguards and far less8Because the United States and Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claims under the Supremacy Clause,the Court need not address their likelihood of prevailing under the Foreign Commerce Clause. See Richland/WilkinJoint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 826 F.3d 1030, 1040 (8th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff must only establisha likelihood of success on "any one of" its claims).23

sophistication than the federal system; (d) state court judges requiring noncitizens to return tocountries where they might not be accepted or might face persecution or torture, in violation offederal laws and treaties; (e) noncitizens being delivered to a port of entry with no clear mechanismfor what happens next; and (f) corresponding impacts on international relations and foreign affairs.Collectively, these harms are significant enough to make the threat of irreparable harm factorweigh in favor of injunctive relief as to both the United States and Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs. See Texas,2024 WL 861526, at *38-40; see also South Carolina, 720 F.3d at 533 (“The irreparable injury tothe nation's foreign policy if the relevant sections take effect has been clearly established by theUnited States. And for individual, unlawfully present immigrants and others, the likelihood ofchaos resulting from South Carolina enforcing its separate immigration regime is apparent.").Regarding the balance of harms and public interest factors, the Eighth Circuit has held thatthey "drop from the case" altogether if a plaintiff establishes preemption and irreparable harm.Bank One v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844, 847-48 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[The party challenging the statelegislation] will be entitled to injunctive relief no matter what the harm to the State, and the publicinterest will perforce be served by enjoining the enforcement of the invalid provisions of statelaw."). More recently, the Eighth Circuit has held that those two factors “merge” when the partyopposing the injunction is a state official acting in his or her official capacity. See Eggers v. Evnen,48 F.4th 561, 564-65 (8th Cir. 2022). In an abundance of caution, the Court will not disregard thebalance of harm and public interest factors altogether, but rather will follow Eggers v. Evnen bytreating them as one-and-the-same.The crucial question is whose interest prevails in a situation where the United States andState of Iowa are on opposite sides of the case, as both sides can credibly claim injury to the publicwhen they are enjoined from executing their respective laws as they see fit. See Texas, 97 F.4th at295-96 (recognizing that both the United States and Texas face potential irreparable harm). TheFifth Circuit held that in the areas of immigration and foreign affairs, it is the federal interest thatprevails, as “state and local interests are subservient to those of the nation at large.” Id. at 296(citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1941)). The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits agree.See Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301 (“[W]e discern no harm from the state's nonenforcement of invalidlegislation."); South Carolina, 720 F.3d at 533 (affirming entry of preliminary injunction). ThisCourt finds these cases persuasive and therefore concludes that the “merged” balance of harm and24

public interest factors weigh in favor of injunctive relief when, as here, the state law is likelypreempted by federal law. See also Guttau, 190 F.3d at 847–48.This conclusion does not change even if, as Defendants argue, Senate File 2340 should beinterpreted the same way as federal law. In that scenario, Iowa is not trying to enforce any uniqueinterest, but rather is trying to help (or, one might say, to compel) the United States to carry outfederal immigration laws. The federal interest remains just as paramount in this circ*mstance as itwould be if the federal and state laws diverged. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401 (“Field preemptionreflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallelto federal standards.").In sum, the Dataphase factors weigh in favor of injunctive relief for both the United Statesand Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs as to the provisions of Senate File 2340 making illegal reentry a statelaw crime, requiring state court judges to enter orders requiring noncitizens to leave, andforbidding the abatement of state criminal prosecutions even when defendants have initiated orintend to initiate federal proceedings to establish lawful status. Because Defendants admit theseprovisions cannot be severed from the remaining aspects of Senate File 2340 (see United StatesDocket ECF 28, p. 51), the Court concludes that the Dataphase factors weigh in favor ofpreliminary injunctive relief as to Senate File 2340 as a whole.VI.CONCLUSION.The United States and Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on themerits of their position that federal immigration law preempts Senate File 2340 under both conflictand field preemption. For this reason, and because the remaining preliminary injunction factorsalso weigh in favor of injunctive relief, the Court GRANTS the motions for preliminary injunctionfiled by the United States and Iowa MMJ Plaintiffs in their respective cases. Defendants are herebyENJOINED from enforcing Senate File 2340 pending further proceedings.IT IS SO ORDERED.Dated: June 17, 2024STEPHEN H. LOCHERU.S. DISTRICT JUDGE25